1:Gallin E-4,5 (1957-1958) 1966
AD5 Taiwan Hokkien AD5
Taiwan AD6
Formosa AD1 •

F 175 648 F 175 648 722 727 161 423 464 [178] [462] Tn 175 423 [648] [241] [434] Tn [161] Tn 197

ists brought a change in regime to Taiwan. This is known as the "Restoration." At the outset the Taiwanese people welcomed the change, feeling that the coming of the Chinese represented a reunion with their own "race." With the advent of peace, there was a general return of men to the land. Only one Hsin Hsing villager had been killed in the war in Southeast Asia. The other villagers from Hsin Hsing who had surrendered or been taken as prisoners while working in Japanese labor groups were returned to Taiwan in ships. The return of these men to the land was followed by a general population increase, and in the Hsin Hsing area this quickly aggravated the problem of land scarcity; tenancy became a greater problem than ever before. Families could neither buy nor rent enough land to support themselves adequately, and, in addition, the war period had brought about a significant alteration in local patterns of division of labor. In the absence of the men the women had assumed new roles and responsibilities and had begun to take an active part in the operation of the land. This change was so well established that from about 1948 on it became possible for the men to work elsewhere for periods of varying length to supplement the family's farm income. This was the beginning of a new and ever-increasing trend of mobility to Taipei, a trend not confined to the Hsin Hsing area, although it may have begun there earlier than in most other parts of Taiwan. Some men hired out as farm laborers or worked as itinerant merchants in the area. But it is significant that local industrial development has been so slight that it has offered no economic alternatives to the villagers.

After 1949, when the movement of the remnants of the Chinese Nationalist forces from the mainland to Taiwan was halted, the regime instituted a new policy of government rule and reform. The Land Reform Acts between 1949 and 1953 were the most important aspect of this policy. The Land Reform, the increased availability of fertilizer, the infusion of great quantities of economic aid from the United States, and the great increase of supplementary income from villagers working in Taipei have all contributed to an apparent rise in the Taiwanese farmer's standard of living. But the basic problem of population pressure and land scarcity continues to worsen, affecting both economic and social aspects of village life.

LANGUAGE AS AN INDICATION OF HISTORICAL SEQUENCE

In 1958 there were four main languages spoken in Taiwan: Japanese, Taiwanese, Mandarin, and Hakka. The latter three are usually referred to as dialects of Chinese, but since they are not mutually intelligible, they are actually different languages, and will be referred

4:Grajdanzev--144-146 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-1-3
116, 439, 656, 722, 177.43 Japan
636.43

"These tables [pages 143-144 in category 116--analyst] are of some value beyond the topic of immediate interest. Elaborate theories of international trade have been constructed, the purpose of which is to explain the movement of international trade as distinct from internal trade, but these theories pay little or no attention to factors of political control which are so often of paramount importance in this sphere. Before the occupation of Taiwan, Japan occupied a very modest [145] place in the trade of the island and even after the conquest, her share was at first small; in the period 1896-1900 imports from Japan made up on the average only 27 percent of the total and exports to Japan, only 19.6 percent. It is true that these figures are rather too low because of the absence of data on Japan's trade in 1896, but if these data were available, they would probably increase Japan's share by only 4 or 5 percent. The fact is that even after the occupation of the island, and in spite of the presence of large detachments of troops and swarms of Japanese officials and adventurers, trade continued for some time to flow chiefly in the old channels. However, this situation was soon changed. In 1926-1930 exports to Japan amounted to 85.5 percent of total exports and in 1937 reached a maximum of 93.2 percent, a figure probably unsurpassed in the history of other colonial countries. The same development was achieved in imports. In 1926-30 Japan's share was 68.3 percent, in 1931-35 it was 83.4, and in 1938 it reached a maximum of 89.4. The slight fall

in Japan's share in 1938 and 1939 is apparent rather than real, for in these years Kwantung, Manchoukuo, and maritime China became to all intents and purposes Japanese colonies and for the Japanese in Taiwan it makes no difference from the point of view of profits and foreign exchange whether they trade with Japan or with these regions. In 1939 the share of this 'yen bloc area' of Taiwan's trade was 97.8 percent of her exports and 96.5 percent of her imports. For comparison let us look at the share of China. In 1896-1900 her share in Taiwan exports averaged 63.1 percent, in 1926-30, only 7.0, in 1936, 2.0, and in 1937, 1.3. The same picture appears in the case of imports, for which the corresponding percentages are 37.4, 13.8, 2.9, and 1.9. China is near, --just across the Taiwan Strait, her population is vast her cities are growing, her products are held in high esteem by the Chinese population of the island, she is in great need of Taiwan's products, and yet the trade between these two regions continued to fall catastrophically. But in 1937-1938 the most important points on the Chinese coast were occupied by the Japanese. By 1939 the area under the latter's domination has increased further, and a surprising change is occuring [sic]--the trade of Taiwan with China now shows a remarkable increase.[146]In 1937 exports from Taiwan to China were valued at 5,575,000 yen, but by 1939 they had risen to 33,840,000. Imports from China in 1938 were valued at 1,954,000 yen, in 1939, at 4,253,000. Although China experienced war in the last three years, though many of her cities were ruined, and the purchasing power of the population has fallen, the trade is better than at the start of the conflict. The reason for this reversal

lies not in the economic situation; it is rooted in the change in the political conditions for now maritime China is virtually a Japanese colony.

This will help us to understand why the foreigners--British, Americans, and others--were gradually ousted from Taiwan. Before 1895 British and American trade with the island was larger than that of Japan, the most important branches of trade, as well as shipping, were in British hands. The British owned Douglas Co. monopolized shipping, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation dominated the financial sphere, Jardine Matheson, Dent, and Samuel Samuel traded in camphor, sugar, tea, and other products, while the trade in rice was chiefly in the hands of Chinese. Mitsui Bussan--the pioneer Japanese firm--did not appear on the island till 1898. The share of Great Britain in Taiwan's imports fell from 7.3 percent in 1896-1900 to 0.1 in 1936 and to almost zero in 1939, while in the same period that of the United States fell in 1896-1900, 3,413,009 in 1929, and 1,750,000 in 1939. from 5.3 to 1 and to 0.4.[sic] In 1896-1900 Taiwan's average annual imports from Great Britain were valued at 1,326,000 yen, in 1926-30 (in depreciated yen) at 3,083,000 yen and in 1936, at 392,000. The imports from the U.S.A. amounted to 957,000 yen in 1896-1900, 3,413,009 in 1929, and 1,750,000 in 1939. (The purchasing power of the yen of 1939 is probably not more than one-fourth of what it was in 1896-1900.)"

4:Grajdanzev--151-152 S 4 (no date) 1942 Formosans -1-2
116, 439, 722, 177.43 Japan
636.43

"In return for exports to the value of 593 million yen in 1939 Taiwan received only 409 million yen worth of imports (69 percent). In order to move these exports to Japan certain conditions are obviously necessary. Taiwan must import rails, railway equipment, harbor equipment, bags for rice and sugar, fertilizers, etc. Taiwan's exports--rice, bananas, sugar, tea, pineapples, fresh fish, etc. --are foodstuffs. But most of the imports enumerated are of no direct use to the islanders themselves; they are beneficial only insofar as they help them to secure other goods. They are really costs of production. In 1939 at least 60.7 million yen worth of fertilizers, including bean cakes and other cakes, (included in 'all others' in the table above) and about 8 million yen worth of gunny sacks were imported. Another group of imports is connected with the effort to turn the island into a powerful base for further advances into China [152] and the Southern countries. Port facilities far beyond the needs of Taiwan itself, powerful radio stations, fortresses, strategic railways, factories producing war materials are being built. Again we cannot determine exactly how great this group of imports is, though we can guess its growth by following the growth of 'ores, metals and manufactures thereof', etc. These two groups, which in themselves contribute little to the welfare of the islanders, increased from 28 million yen in 1925-1929 to 62 million in 1936, to 70 million in 1937, to 78 million in 1938 and to 86 million in 1939. To some extent this growth is purely illusory since it reflects the rise in prices in these years, but we know that in the Japanese colonies, just as in Japan, the consumption of metals, machines, for peace time uses,

4:Grajdanzev--151-152 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans-2
116, 439, 722, 177.43 Japan
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etc., was reduced or stopped completely, so that the greater part is now available for military purposes."

625 blown up and water works wrecked if the Com-
648 munists had had their way. The lives of responsible personages would have been in constant danger, too. Then, the risk of internal trouble during a possible invasion from outside would have been very grave."[17] It appears that, in order to save Formosa from Communist domination, rigid government control may not be entirely indefensible.

722 During the past few years, as conditions
698 on the island grew more stable, the Nationalist
693 Government has been taking measures to guard against unwarranted arrest and imprisonment. In a decree issued on January 29, 1951, the Executive Yuan prescribed that public defenders should be provided in the military court to defend persons accused of violating martial law in cases where the minimum punishment would be not less than five years' imprisonment. A spouse, lineal blood relative, collateral blood relative within third degree, or a statutory agent may be present at the trial and testify on behalf of the accused.

722 Since 1949 Formosa has been subject to
698 martial law. Article 8 provides that the following offenses committed in strategic zones may be tried by the military court: (a) offenses against the internal security of the state, (b) against the external security of the state, (c) against public order, (d) against public safety, (e) forgery, counte r feiting of currency, valuable securities, documents, (f) murder or homicide, (g) restraining personal liberty, (h) snatching, robbery, and piracy, (i) intimidation and kidnapping, and (j) malicious mischief. If provisions

17. Lih-wu Han, op. cit., p. 49.

722 698 of martial law should be strictly applied, the military court would replace the civil courts of law in Formosa. However, orders issued by the Executive Yuan on June 1, 1952 and reissued on October 14, 1954, restrict the jurisdiction of the military court. The order of October 14, 1954, specifies that military courts have jurisdiction only in those cases involving espionage and insurrection; all other offenses are to be tried in civil court. This order seeks to protect the rights and freedoms of the people of Formosa against infringement by over-zealous, defense-minded militarists.

52:Barclay S-5 (no date)1954 AD1 Formosa AD1

"ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT" IN TAIWAN

Industrial Growth during the War

●722 After setting the stage for limited industrialization by their treatment of large business in Taiwan, Japanese leaders after 1940 began actively to move the players. The centralized corporate structure had been expected to be adequate preparation for most of the demands of war. The Government-General made frantic last-minute attempts to expand specific fields in which Japan itself was short, particularly aluminum and coal. But before long the subordination of Taiwan's economy to heavy industry in Japan, which had seemed so satisfactory, turned out to be a source of weakness. Naval losses started to interfere with shipping between Japan and Taiwan. Many of the small but essential items supplied from the home islands (special equipment, replacement parts, fuels, and skills) became unobtainable. Certain large imports such as fertilizer were cut off.

None of these shortages was fundamentally important for the island itself, since food was sufficient for its population and little else had previously been imported. Lack of articles of the first sort did play havoc with some of the new industrial output, and caused much of the equipment to deteriorate. Exports of aluminum and coal slowed down to a trickle by 1944, and practically all shipping to Japan—even rice and sugar—was discontinued early in 1945.[29] By the time of Japan's surrender much of the highly organized economic life had come to a stop, but Taiwan suffered no devastating damage as a result of the war. Agriculture was still conducted as usual, except that without fertilizer and other accustomed capital the yields had fallen off substantially.

Accomplishments of Japanese Colonial Policies

648 659 Having described the workings of colonial administration in Taiwan, one should have some idea of its accomplishments before going on to discuss in later chapters its consequences in the lives of the Taiwanese. For this purpose, the abundance of records kept by the Japanese is often a hindrance rather than a help. In general the economic statistics are not up to the standards of the population data. Numerical tables are plentiful, but explanations of what the numbers mean are not. They disagree from source to source, seldom with any reason given for the discrepancies. One must therefore look for summarizing measures, and not for fine detail.

[29] See Cohen, J. (1949), pp. 154-156.